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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—COMMERCE CLAUSE—LET THEM EAT . . . 
BROCCOLI? National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566 (2012).  
I. INTRODUCTION 
“DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN” the Chicago Tribune headline read.1 
It was November 3, 1948. The political atmosphere was charged, and the 
editors were under pressure to get a story out quickly.2 Little did they know, 
it would become one of the most famous headlines in history.3 
Fast forward sixty-four years, and while a great many things have 
changed, some things remain the same. For example, while news can now 
be shared across the globe almost instantaneously, reporters and editors still 
want to be the first and the fastest to report new information. In the summer 
of 2012, it seemed as though more attention than ever before turned to the 
Supreme Court of the United States.4 For media outlets, there was even 
more pressure: the eyes and ears of the nation were waiting for a quick and 
simple answer to a complex question—from a forum that is anything but 
quick. Or simple.  
When the time came to announce the fate of the key components of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”), several 
major news sources, including CNN, Fox News, NPR, Time, and the Huff-
ington Post, got ahead of themselves. In a move reminiscent of the Trib-
une’s, these sources informed the public that the Supreme Court ruled the 
individual mandate unconstitutional.5 
  
 1. Arthur Sears Henning, Dewey Defeats Truman, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1948, at 1. 
 2. Tim Jones, Dewey Defeats Truman: Well, Everyone Makes Mistakes, CHI. TRI., (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/chi-chicagodays 
deweydefeats-story,0,6484067.story (“Like most newspapers, the Tribune . . . was lulled into 
a false sense of security by polls that repeatedly predicted a Dewey victory. Critically im-
portant, though, was a printers' strike, which forced the paper to go to press hours before it 
normally would.”). 
 3. See id. 
 4. To illustrate, SCOTUS Blog, a blog focused on Supreme Court activity, had approx-
imately 520,000 live contemporaneous readers at the time of the decision, and by 10:22 
AM—minutes after the decision was issued—there were approximately 866,000 live-blog 
readers. See Adrienne LaFrance, Anatomy of a Spike: How SCOTUS Blog Dealt with its 
Biggest Traffic Day Ever, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (June 28, 2012, 5:18 PM), 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2012/06/anatomy-of-a-spike-how-scotus-blog-dealt-with-its-
biggest-traffic-day-ever/. In just over four hours the blog had 2.9 million hits. Id. As put in 
one of their tweets early that morning, “Probably more traffic today than in SB’s first 5 years, 
combined. So grateful; a little scared. #teamlyle #dontcrash.” Id. 
 5. Adam Peck, In A Rush To Be First, CNN, FOX, Huffington Post and TIME Get 
Supreme Court Story Exactly Wrong, THINK PROGRESSIVE, June 28, 2012 (11:27 AM) 
http://thinkprogress.org/media/2012/06/28/508072/in-a-rush-to-be-first-cnn-fox-huffington-
 
560 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35  
But why? Given the era and the circumstances, the Tribune’s gaffe, 
while unfortunate, is at least understandable. And yet, what excuse would 
news agencies in 2012 provide? While it may initially appear to be a simple 
case of rushing to be the first to report, it could also be because many 
thought the individual mandate was constitutional only through the Com-
merce Clause. Thus, the Affordable Care Act’s constitutionality as an entire 
statutory scheme, appeared to also rely on the Clause.6 
Indeed, if one looks at some of the things Congress has passed “in the 
name of commerce” so to speak—such as forbidding the hunting of animals 
by airplane;7 asserting that those who flee a state from prosecution or giving 
testimony are committing a federal offense;8 or punishing via fines or im-
prisonment anyone who attempts to impede a woman from entering an abor-
tion clinic9—requiring the public to either purchase minimum essential 
health insurance coverage or be penalized10 seems something very close to a 
regulation of commercial activity.  
But, this was not the case. As it turned out, the imposition of minimum 
essential coverage, that is, requiring individuals to purchase and maintain 
health insurance, exceeded Congressional power under the Commerce 
  
post -and-time-get-supreme-court-story-exactly-wrong/ (showing a Fox Television news 
banner titled “SUPREME COURT FINDS HEALTH CARE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL,” and a CNN webpage displaying the following ticker: “Breaking 
News: The Supreme Court has struck down the individual mandate for health care.” Id. On 
Twitter, CNN’s original tweet read: "Supreme Court strikes down individual mandate portion 
of health care law."). Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Joan McCarter, Affordable Care Act unconstitutional? Not according to 
law professors, DAILY KOS (Jan. 19, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2011/01/19/937279/-affordable-care-act-unconstitutional-not-according-to-law-professors?
detail=hide (comparing GOP arguments for the Act’s unconstitutionality with a joint state-
ment provided by one-hundred law professors asserting the opposite.) To illustrate, take for 
example Congressman Lungren’s comment that “[c]ertainly the Commerce Clause lacks the 
elasticity that would accommodate a requirement that every American buy health insurance 
which conforms to the dictates of the federal government as the federal government would 
change it on a yearly basis.” Compare this with an excerpt from the law professors’ statement 
which notes that “[t]he problems facing the modern healthcare system today are precisely the 
sort of problems beyond the reach of individual states that led the Framers to give Congress 
authority to regulate interstate commerce.” Id. 
 7. See 16 U.S.C § 742j-1 (2006). 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2006). 
 9. See 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2006).  
 10. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (“An applicable individual shall for each month beginning 
after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applica-
ble individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.”). Further, “If a 
taxpayer . . . fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months, then, [un-
less otherwise provided,] there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with respect to 
such failures . . . .” Id. 
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Clause.11 According to the controlling opinion, this turned on the difference 
between regulating existing commercial activity, and compelling individuals 
to participate in commerce (by purchasing a product).12 By not participating 
(not purchasing this product), the Court reasoned there is no commercial 
activity to regulate. Thus it is not within the scope of Congress’s control.13 
Taking this distinction into consideration, then, how does it change the 
current understanding of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, if at all? To an-
swer this question, this note first explores the intentions and meanings of the 
early courts regarding the Commerce Clause, and thereafter, follows this 
understanding as it progresses through New Deal legislation and various 
other legislative attempts.14 Next, the “four corners” of the Commerce 
Clause are established by discussing the four cases widely considered to 
comprise the outer bounds of the issue.15 Then, an overview of federal ap-
pellate treatment of the Commerce Clause’s specific applicability to the 
individual mandate is provided.16 This is followed by a discussion of the 
Chief Justice’s controlling opinion, as well as Justice Ginsburg’s concurring 
opinion regarding the matter.17 Finally, this note compares and contrasts 
how the Supreme Court’s treatment of congressional use of the Commerce 
Clause in the healthcare ruling fits within the previous understanding of the 
Clause, what it might mean for existing or future legislation, and ultimately 
concludes that even though this was a decision that likely received the most 
attention of any Supreme Court case to date, the law itself, essentially re-
mains unchanged.18 
II. CONGRESS MAY REGULATE 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States,”19 and to “make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper” to the execution of that power.20 This authority is broad. Con-
gress may “regulate the channels of interstate commerce”; it may “regulate 
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or 
  
 11. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2587–91 (2012). 
 12. See id. at 2587. 
 13. See id. at 2587–90. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. See infra Parts VII–VIII. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 20. Id. at cl. 18. 
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things in interstate commerce”; and it may “regulate activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.”21  
 
A. The Meanings of a Word 
 
Whenever a situation arises that requires interpreting the meanings of 
Congress, or the meanings of the Framers, or the meanings of the parties, 
simply looking at words and definitions is hardly enough for proper consid-
eration. Thus, when searching for interpretations or understandings, one 
must look beyond the words themselves, and instead look more closely into 
the consensus of what truly comprises the meaning of a word. This is well-
portrayed in an essay by critically-acclaimed novelist and distinguished pro-
fessor, Gloria Naylor:  
I'm not going to enter the debate here about whether it is language that 
shapes reality or vice versa . . . I will simply take the position that the 
spoken word, like the written word, amounts to a nonsensical arrange-
ment of sounds or letters without a consensus that assigns “meaning.” 
And building from the meanings of what we hear, we order reality. 
Words themselves are innocuous; it is the consensus that gives them true 
power.22 
Accordingly, this inquiry of “words” will be brief. While the actual text 
is a logical starting place in constitutional analysis—and indeed, attempting 
to understand what sort of power words are given at their formation is an 
excellent tool—in order to determine how the most recent commerce clause 
decision truly affects the understanding of the scope of the Clause, the focus 
here will be to first determine how the meaning has evolved. 
 
B. The Meaning of Commerce 
 “We first inquire, then—What is commerce? The term, as this court 
many times has said, is one of extensive import. No all-embracing defini-
tion has ever been formulated.”23 
To begin, “commerce” is “the activity embracing all forms of the pur-
chase and sale of goods and services” and originates from the Latin 
  
 21. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005). 
 22. Gloria Naylor, Mommy, What Does Nigger Mean?, in NEW WORLDS OF LITERATURE: 
WRITINGS FROM AMERICA’S MANY CULTURES 344, 344–35 (Jerome Beaty & J. Paul Hunter 
eds., 2d ed. 1994). In a textbook display of situational irony, the essay was renamed the more 
polite “The Meanings of a Word” when used in later collections. 
 23. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297–98 (1936) (emphasis added). 
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“commercium,” meaning “trade.”24 Further, within the text of the Constitu-
tion, this “commerce” may be regulated “among the several states.” 
“Among,” a preposition, may encompass “in, into, or through the midst of,” 
as well as “in association or connection with,” and “surrounded by.”25 When 
considered together, within the text of the Constitution, then, this indicates 
that Congress may regulate the interstate transport of goods and services. 26 
1. Early Interpretations 
One of the first cases dealing with commerce, Gibbons v. Ogden,27 
demonstrates this point. In Gibbons, the New York legislature granted an 
exclusive right to the use of the waterways in the state to one person. Gib-
bons, a New Jersey citizen, challenged the grant.28 Chief Justice Marshall 
concluded that this commerce power logically must extend to navigation, as 
“[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is inter-
course.”29  
After Gibbons, several decades passed without the Court significantly 
addressing Congress’s exercise of the Commerce power.30 Instead, the Court 
dedicated more attention to considering and developing the dormant Com-
merce Clause.31 By the close of the nineteenth century, the understanding of 
“commerce” had not expanded far beyond the concepts of those enumerated 
in Gibbons: intercourse, traffic, transportation, navigation, trading, purchas-
ing, and selling.32 Congress’s commerce power correlated to this under-
  
 24. Commerce Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
commerce (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 25. Among Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/among 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2013).  
 26. Interstate Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
interstate (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (“connecting or involving different states”). 
 27. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).  
 28. Id. at 1–3. 
 29. Id. at 189. 
 30. See Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Con-
gress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 877 (2002). 
 31. In these cases, the primary question is whether a State may legislate in an area deal-
ing with federal commerce powers if the federal government had not. See generally, e.g., 
Brannon P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Constitutional Structure 
(Feb. 19, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID260830_code010320510.pdf?abstractid=260830&mirid=1(last accessed Oct. 10, 
2013). 
 32. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885). 
It matters not that the transportation is made in ferry-boats which pass between 
the states every hour of the day. The means of transportation of persons and 
freight between the states does not change the character of the business as one of 
commerce, nor does the time within which the distance between the states may 
be traversed. Commerce among the states consists of intercourse and traffic be-
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standing, and thus extended insofar as the ability to determine conditions, 
restrictions, or requirements under which commerce may be conducted, and 
“the means by which it may be aided and encouraged.”33 
2. The Progressives, Depression, and a New Deal 
Understandably, in the beginning, the states naturally attempted to 
maintain their independence.34 This was due in part to politics, but also arose 
out of geographic, economic, and social conditions.35 And yet, to avoid the 
bigotries that often accompany staunch protectionism, and to promote uni-
form trade and travel, the Founders explicitly insisted that Congress main-
tain control of commerce and its regulation.36  
Despite these original conditions, however, the end of the nineteenth 
century brought with it less distinction between local and national econom-
ics.37 According to the Progressives of the time, national issues commanded 
national responses, and existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence was a bar-
rier to their concept of government.38 President Roosevelt’s New Deal 
quickly illustrated this just a few years later: a series of economic programs 
designed to help America recover from the Great Depression.39  
  
tween their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and property, and 
the navigation of public waters for that purpose, as well as the purchase, sale, and 
exchange of commodities. 
Id. 
 33. Id. at 203–04. 
 34. See, e.g., Frank J. Goodnow, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1911). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2010) (citing 
Albert O. Hirschman, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR 
CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 60–63 (1977)). Indeed, “many eighteenth-century thinkers 
believed that commercial relations fostered tolerance and understanding, smoothed over 
social, religious, and cultural differences, brought refinement of manners, and, in the long 
run, political and social peace.” Id. at 17. 
 37. Cf. Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive Politi-
cal Theory and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 403, 417–18 (2002) (describing the Industrial Revolution’s effect of merging of local and 
national economic regulation). 
 38. See id. at 417–23. Further, as mentioned in Newberry v. United States, “It is settled   
. . . that the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce does not reach whatever is 
essential thereto. Without agriculture, manufacture, mining, etc., commerce could not exist 
but this fact does not suffice to subject them to the control of Congress.” 256 U.S. 232, 257 
(1921). 
 39. See generally Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 
(1994) (discussing the political and legal history surrounding New Deal legislation). 
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Economists still debate the precise cause of the Great Depression.40 In 
the 1920’s, the speculative stock market flourished.41 The trading environ-
ment was efficient.42 Federal regulation of commercial activity was sparse. 
These things, coupled with low transactional costs and access to infor-
mation, created a speculative bubble within the market.43 Thus, while the 
fundamental failure of the system was due to the “volume of investment,” 
there were also very “few tools available to policymakers to counter this 
essential fact.”44 
The breadth and depth of the Great Depression’s devastation to the 
American economy was unparalleled.45 After roughly four years of “unre-
lenting economic meltdown,” the 1932 presidential election came to center 
on the function of federal government within the economics of the nation.46 
President-elect Roosevelt rejected the concept that uncontrolled economy 
could lead to prosperity or that the economy could correct itself over time.47 
He proposed economic reform and regulation through the New Deal, 
through which a “better ordered system of national economy” might be 
forged. 48 
3. A Brave New Society?49 
Most New Deal advocates identified with Progressive principals of 
government and social reform.50 Some idealists thought that if the true na-
ture of politics was “to facilitate social reform” and it was “constitutional 
institutions such as separation of powers and federalism” that prevented the 
realization of reform, then, would it not be better to candidly admit the anti-
quation of the institutions, and instead forge new constitutional interpreta-
tions?51 Bureaucrats (and their attorneys) were aware of these viewpoints, 
but while generally sympathetic to what society felt like it needed at the 
  
 40. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 
62 MD. L. REV. 515, 527 (2003). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Ramirez, supra note 40, at 530. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 531. 
 48. 1 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, Campaign Address at Madison Square Garden, New 
York City, Nov. 5, 1932, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
860, 864 (1938). 
 49. 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF 
UPHEAVAL 392. (1960). 
 50. Claeys, supra note 37, at 426. 
 51. Id. See also SCHLESINGER, supra note 49, at 392–95.  
566 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35  
time, they still retained reservations about essentially attacking the founda-
tions of constitutional understanding to achieve such ends.52 
a. The National Industrial Recovery Act 
As stated in the preamble of the National Industrial Recovery Act, the 
Great Depression “burden[ed] interstate and foreign commerce, affect[ed] 
the public welfare, and undermine[d] the standards of living of the Ameri-
can people.”53 A largely unpopular act,54 it intended to establish fair-
competition codes in trades or industries as identified by the President.55 In 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,56 Chief Justice Hughes 
wrote how this not only violated the separation of powers doctrine, but how 
it also exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, as the 
Constitution does not provide province to the Supreme Court “to consider 
the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system.”57 
Instead, he explained: 
Our growth and development have called for wide use of the commerce 
power of the federal government in its control over the expanded activi-
ties of interstate commerce and in protecting that commerce from bur-
dens, interferences, and conspiracies to restrain and monopolize it. But 
the authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such an ex-
treme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause itself es-
tablishes, between commerce “among the several States” and the internal 
concerns of a state.58 
b. The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act 
The next year, another portion of New Deal legislation reached, and 
failed, the Supreme Court’s review.59 In Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 
Congress attempted to set price controls for the nation’s coal market, as well 
as regulate hours and wages for coal workers, as it was “affected with a na-
tional public interest.”60 According to the majority, however, the “notion 
  
 52. Id. 
 53. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (previously codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 701–712 (Supp. 1933)), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 54. See Cushman, supra note 40, at 42. 
 55. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
 56. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 57. Id. at 549–50. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936). 
 60. See id.; see also Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 
(1935). 
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that Congress, entirely apart from those powers delegated by the Constitu-
tion, may enact laws to promote the general welfare, have never been ac-
cepted but always definitely rejected by this court.”61  
Regarding the commerce issue, attorneys from seven coal-producing 
states filed briefs supporting the Act’s validity.62 To support their argument, 
they pointed out how coal-producing states could not regulate wages or 
prices without disadvantaging its own producers against outside competi-
tors.63 Further, they asserted that the Commerce Clause precluded states 
from protecting their citizens against outside competition.64 Upon review, 
the Court could not, nor did it, deny the effects of labor disputes in the coal 
industry on interstate commerce. Instead, it attempted to emphasize the need 
to preserve state power, even when facing the problem that the states may 
legislate inharmoniously, or not at all.65 
c. The Switch 
“Where the First New Deal contemplated government, business, and la-
bor marching hand in hand toward a brave new society, the Second New 
Deal proposed to revitalize the tired old society by establishing a frame-
work within which enterprise could be set free.”66  
By 1935, the next set of New Deal legislative drafters were ready to 
tackle the challenges of crafting legislation within the scope of Supreme 
Court precedent.67 Where the first—guided by passion for social refor-
mation—“wanted to draft laws and fight cases in terms of prophetic affirma-
tions,” and generally “resented the whole notion of pussy-footing around to 
avoid offending the stupid prejudices of reactionary judges,” the second 
found it more important to actually have the statute work, instead of promot-
ing a crusade.68 Described as the difference between “sweeping and rhetori-
  
 61. Carter, 298 U.S. at 291. The thought that Congress was under the impression that it 
could regulate in such a way was so egregiously offensive to Justice Sutherland that it actual-
ly provoked what amounted to a nine-page lecture expounding upon why Congress lacked 
this power. See id. at 289–97. 
 62. See Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946, 
59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 671 (1946) (discussing the various arguments before the Court on the 
issue). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Carter, 298 U.S. at 290, 292–94. 
 66. SCHLESINGER, supra note 49, at 392. 
 67. See, e.g., id. at pt. 2. Titled “The Coming of the Second New Deal,” Schlesinger 
discusses the differences of First and Second New Deal legislation, including judicial poli-
tics, legal theories, and the addition of several new lawyers and thinkers to the legislative 
drafting process. See id. at 209. 
 68. Id. at 395.  
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cal legal strokes,” and “exquisite craftsmanship,” “[t]he laws drawn by the 
First New Deal tended to perish before the courts because of loose drafts-
manship and emotional advocacy. The laws drawn by the Second New Deal 
were masterpieces of the lawyer’s art; and they survived.”69 
d. The National Labor Relations Act 
The National Labor Relations Act passed July 5, 1935.70 The Act estab-
lished the National Labor Relations Board, as well as a federal right to col-
lective bargaining for American employees.71 This time, the drafters were 
very careful. Instead of proclaiming that labor relations were affected with 
any sort of national interest, it alternatively provided that “[t]he denial by 
employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employ-
ers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining” can cause “certain sub-
stantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce” that should be eliminat-
ed.72 Litigation ensued. 
As the case wound its way to the Supreme Court, two prominent events 
took place that likely affected the ultimate outcome.73 The first was Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s reelection in November of 1936.74 Construing this victory 
as a sign of tremendous public support for his initiatives even in the face of 
Supreme Court disapproval, the president sought to thwart what he felt as a 
reactionary interpretation of the Constitution.75 To this end, the President 
proposed the second event, the “Court-Packing” plan. While ultimately un-
successful, this likely got the attention of a few of the justices, as it sought to 
appoint an additional justice to the bench for every justice over seventy 
years of age.76 Not surprisingly, when the issue finally did reach the Court in 
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,77 
many were eager to hear exactly how the decision would play out:78 The 
  
 69. Id. Interestingly, to foreshadow, Schlesinger draws another analogy between the two 
rounds of legislation: “The First New Deal characteristically told business what it must do. 
The Second New Deal characteristically told business what it must not do.” Id. at 392. 
 70. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). 
 71. Id. at §§ 3–7, 49 Stat. at 451–52. 
 72. Id at § 1, 49 Stat. at 449; see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 
1, 23, n.2 (1937). 
 73. See Stern, supra note 62, at 677. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id.  
 76. See generally Cushman, supra note 39, at 208–09; Stern, supra note 62, at 677. 
 77. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 78. Stern, supra note 63, at 679 (“The courtroom was jammed on Monday, April 12, 
1937 . . . . The suspense was great as Chief Justice Hughes began to read his opinion in the 
Jones & Laughlin case.”). 
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Act, as a whole, was valid.79 The Court approved of the Act’s language, and 
concluded that it only reached activities that affected commerce.80 Determin-
ing that the definition of “affecting commerce” indicated Congress’s intent 
to exercise “control within constitutional bounds, the Court held this was an 
appropriate use of the commerce power”81 Thus, the question in the case 
became whether or not the “constitutional boundary” was exceeded.82   
After reviewing the cases upholding federal exercise of power over in-
terstate activities, the Chief Justice determined that “[t]he close and intimate 
effect which brings the subject within the reach of federal power may be due 
to activities in relation to productive industry although the industry when 
separately viewed is local.”83 The Court distinguished the case from Carter, 
asserting that there were multiple reasons as to the failure of the Coal Act, 
not just because the production provisions were “beyond any sustainable 
measure of protection of interstate commerce.”84 Accordingly, the analysis 
here hinged on whether or not the labor relations in Jones & Laughlin’s steel 
organization sufficiently affected interstate commerce; thus, the Court con-
cluded that stopping such an operation “by industrial strife would have a 
most serious effect upon interstate commerce.”85  
Perhaps more interestingly, though, is that here the Court fully consid-
ered the futility of attempting to “consider direct and indirect effects [on 
commerce] in an intellectual vacuum.”86 “Because there may be but indirect 
and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host of 
local enterprises throughout the country,” the Court reasoned, “it does not 
follow that other industrial activities do not have such a close and intimate 
relation to interstate commerce as to make the presence of industrial strife a 
matter of the most urgent national concern.”87 Further, if an industry is orga-
nized on a national scale, “making their relation to interstate commerce the 
dominant factor in their activities,” then denying Congress the ability to 
regulate even “when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the 
paralyzing consequences of industrial war” seems not only impractical, but 
also illogical.88 Instead, the Court concluded that, since “interstate com-
  
 79. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 31. 
 80. Id. at 30–31 (“We think it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may be con-
strued so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority . . . . The critical words of 
[the act], prescribing the limits of the Board’s authority in dealing with the labor practices, 
are ‘affecting commerce.’”). 
 81. Id. at 31. 
 82. Id. at 32.  
 83. Id. at 38. 
 84. Id. at 41 (discussing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)). 
 85. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 41–42. 
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merce itself is a practical conception,” then “it is equally true that interfer-
ences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not 
ignore actual experience.”89 It was with this that “actual experience,” that is, 
“actual relation to commerce,” became the benchmark of review.90 
e. The Fair Labor Standards Act 
Before discussing The Fair Labor Standards Act and its role in United 
States v. Darby,91 one case, in particular, warrants brief discussion. In 1918 
the Supreme Court held, just barely, that Congress could not exclude from 
interstate commerce the products of child labor.92 While comfortable with 
the idea of congressional powers limiting deleterious or harmful product 
entering interstate commerce,93 the Court did not think the commerce power 
was an appropriate vehicle through which to regulate something so inherent 
to the states.94 As put by the Hammer majority, this would be an “invasion 
by the federal power of the control of a matter purely local in its charac-
ter.”95 The holding was never subsequently followed, and the distinction was 
soon abandoned.96 By the time of the United States v. Darby decision in 
1941, Hammer’s precedent had “long since been exhausted,”97 and thus the 
Court explicitly overruled the case.98  
The significance of United States v. Darby, particularly, is that it genu-
inely signifies the close of an era of Constitutional thought.99 What the Court 
started in Jones & Laughlin was made implicitly clear in Darby—the earli-
er, more traditional interpretations of the Commerce Clause are obsolete.100  
The Fair Labor Standards Act prohibited both the shipment of goods 
produced in substandard labor conditions across state lines, and substandard 
labor conditions generally—whether or not the goods produced ever crossed 
  
 89. Id. at 42. 
 90. Stern, supra note 63, at 681 (emphasis added). 
 91. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 92. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918). 
 93. Id. at 279–80. 
 94. Id. at 270–71. 
 95. Id. at 276. Discussion of Hammer at this point in the analysis is particularly insight-
ful, as it illustrates the evolution of the meanings of the Commerce Clause to this point thus 
far. 
 96. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116. 
 97. Id. at 116–17. 
 98. Id. at 117. 
 99. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010) (explaining 
the expansion of the definition of “commerce” under which Congress can regulate). 
 100. Id. at 42 (“If an area of concern has significant spillover effects on other states, or 
begins to do so, it shouldn’t matter that it was the traditional concern of state regulation.”). 
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state lines.101 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the congressional 
power over interstate commerce is not simply confined to regulation among 
the states. Rather, “[i]t extends to those activities intrastate which so affect 
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to 
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate 
end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce.”102 
C. Wickard, Lopez, Morrison, & Racih: The “Four Corners” of the Com-
merce Clause 
Once into the 1940’s, the Court would settle comfortably into this 
“newer” sort of application and meaning of commerce power.103 In fact, 
until recently with the Affordable Care Act decision, there arose but four 
cases that overly modified this understanding. These cases, when considered 
individually, initially come across as somewhat juxtaposed but when ana-
lyzed aggregately104 they comprise the outer boundaries of modern com-
merce clause jurisprudence. 
Accordingly, Wickard v. Filburn105 is first and foremost among modern 
Commerce Clause discussion, and the most analogous case to apply to the 
question of the individual mandate.106 In 1938, Congress passed the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act in an effort to stabilize the price of wheat nationally, 
by limiting the area farmers could devote to wheat production.107 Roscoe 
Filburn, however, ignored these restrictions.108 He planted and harvested 
  
 101. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as 29 U.S.C.A § 
201 (West 2013)). 
 102. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118. 
 103. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 
1387, 1443 (1987); see generally Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 
452 U.S. 264 (1981) (holding that the rational basis test from Heart of Atlanta justifies con-
gressional regulation of an activity which creates environmental defects); Maryland v. Wirtz, 
392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding the Fair Labor Standards Act constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that Congress needs 
only a rational basis for finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce for the Court to 
find the regulation constitutional under the Commerce Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. 
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that as racial discrimination in public places 
substantially affects interstate commerce, banning such discrimination is a valid exercise of 
commerce power by Congress); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (overturning use of 
distinction between indirect and direct effects on commerce, allowing more freedom of regu-
lation to Congress); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding the Commerce 
Clause grants Congress the power to place restrictions on the production of goods). 
   104. No pun intended. 
 105. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 106. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588 (2012). 
 107. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113. 
 108. Id. at 114–15. 
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almost double his allotment,109 but he argued this was permissible because 
he used the excess wheat solely for private consumption.110 As the excess 
wheat never entered commerce, let alone interstate commerce, the logic fol-
lowed, it was not subject to federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause.111 The Supreme Court disagreed.112  
Had Filburn not grown excess wheat at home, the Court reasoned, he 
would have had to purchase wheat on the open market.113 Although the 
Court did acknowledged that the excess production of one farmer would 
have a trivial effect on the market, it nevertheless found that “his contribu-
tion, taken together with that of many others similarly situated” would have 
an aggregate effect on the market that would be “far from trivial.”114  
Accordingly, non-commercial intrastate activity was within the reach 
of Congress, if such activity—in the aggregate—would have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.115 This decision, especially when considered 
alongside Darby from the previous year seems to depict a Court very 
grounded when considering this more modern concept of what Congress’s 
commerce power may encompass. 
Much later, in the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Congress made 
it a federal offense to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone.116 Two 
years later, Alfonzo Lopez, Jr., a twelfth grade student, arrived at Edison 
High School in San Antonio, Texas, carrying a concealed .38-caliber hand-
gun.117 School officials were tipped off, and Lopez confessed to the act.118 
The district court sentenced him to six months of imprisonment and two 
years of supervised release,119 but Lopez appealed under the argument that 
Congress had exceeded the bounds of the Commerce Clause. And here, the 
Supreme Court agreed that Congress had indeed exceeded its power.120 
In its analysis, the Court first identified three categories of activity that 
Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) those activities 
  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 118–19. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 128–29. 
 113. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128. 
 114. Id. at 127–28. 
 115. See id. at 128–29. 
 116. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) 
(1988 ed., Supp. V)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 552. 
 120. Id. at 551. 
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having a substantial effect on or relation to interstate commerce.121 Dismiss-
ing the first two categories as inapplicable, the Court opined on whether 
possessing a firearm in a school zone had a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.122  
Here, the government argued, that possession of firearms in school 
zones may result in violent crime which would create a substantial cost to 
the economy through insurance, “[reduce] the willingness of individuals to 
travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe,” and dis-
rupt the learning environment—resulting in a “less productive citizenry.”123 
The Court, even though it held Congress need only have a rational basis for 
believing substantial effects exist,124 was less than impressed with the gov-
ernment's reasoning.125 
Instead, the Court reasoned, the “possession of a gun in a local school 
zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition else-
where, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”126 As such, to 
uphold such a contention here, it would require the Court to “pile inference 
upon inference” in such a way that would very well convert Congress’s 
commerce powers into something more akin to “a general police power of 
the sort retained by the States.127 That it simply would not do. 
A few years later, the Violence Against Women Act, passed in 1994, 
provided a federal civil remedy to victims of gender-based violence.128 That 
same fall, a Virginia Tech student, Christy Brzonkala, was allegedly assault-
ed and raped by two members of the school's football team, Antonio Morri-
son and James Crawford.129 Brzonkala believed her failure to preserve phys-
ical evidence foreclosed the ability to press criminal charges.130 When Vir-
ginia Tech's administrative system failed to take action against her alleged 
assailants, she filed suit under the Violence Against Women Act.131 Signal-
ing a distressing trend for Congress, the Supreme Court again reigned in 
Congress's commerce powers.132 
  
 121. Id. at 558–59. 
 122. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
 123. Id. at 563–64. 
 124. Id. at 557. 
    125. Id. at 567–68. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605 (2000). 
 129. Id. at 602. 
 130. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772, 774 (W.D. Va. 
1996), rev’d sub nom. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th 
Cir. 1997),  on reh’g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom. United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 131. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 603–04. 
 132. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. 
574 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35  
Citing Lopez, the Court found that gender-motivated crimes of violence 
were not, in any sense, economic activity.133 Further, while acknowledging 
Congress did its due diligence in establishing the serious impact of gender-
motivated violence on victims and their families, the Court rejected the 
“but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the sup-
pression of which has always been the prime object of the States’ police 
power) to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce.”134 Further, the 
Court noted, “[p]etitioners’ reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to 
regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as 
well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the 
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national econ-
omy is undoubtedly significant.”135 Thus, the Court held, Congress cannot 
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on the aggre-
gate effect of that conduct on interstate commerce.136 
Finally, when California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act of 
1996, they became the first State to authorize limited use of marijuana for 
medicinal purposes.137 The Federal Controlled Substances Act, however, 
allowed for no such exception.138 Federal Drug Enforcement Administration 
agents made this fact painfully139 clear to Angel Raich and Diane Monson 
when they seized and destroyed all six of Monson's cannabis plants.140 Raich 
and Monson brought action against the Attorney General of the United 
States and the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the Federal Con-
trolled Substances Act to the extent it prevents them from possessing, ob-
taining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal medical use.141 
Here, the Court found the facts in Raich strikingly similar to those in 
Wickard,142 and it reiterated that “Congress can regulate purely intrastate 
activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it 
concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the 
regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”143 Further, citing “the 
enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana culti-
vated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere and concerns about diversion 
  
 133. Id. at 612–13. 
 134. Id. at 615–17. 
 135. Id. at 615–16 (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. at 617. 
 137. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2005). 
 138. Id. at 14. 
 139. Id. at 7 (“Indeed, Raich’s physician believes that forgoing cannabis treatments would 
certainly cause Raich excruciating pain and could very well prove fatal.”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18. 
 143. Id. 
2013] LET THEM EAT . . . BROCCOLI? 575 
into illicit channels,” the Court found that Congress clearly had a rational 
basis for believing that “failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and 
possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the [Controlled Sub-
stances Act],”144 undermining the “federal interest in eliminating commer-
cial transactions in the interstate [marijuana] market in their entirety.”145 
D. The Four Corners of Commerce 
These four cases, or corners, ostensibly provide a tidy square—or at 
least parallelogram—in which the modern legal understanding of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence is contained. As mentioned earlier, taken individually, 
these cases provide little guidance, but it is Raich that really brings this 
modern commerce interpretation together; that is, with Wickard there 
emerges what could come across as unlimited congressional power through 
the Commerce Clause, but as demonstrated by Lopez and Morrison this is 
not so. In Raich however, we see that the Court did something interesting, 
that is, it confined Morrison and Lopez to instances of recently enacted fed-
eral statutes that attempt to reach activity that cannot be plausibly character-
ized as “commercial,” either by itself or as part of some greater economic 
regulatory scheme.146 Furthermore, as Lopez and Morrison were striking 
down more-or-less symbolic statutes that duplicate existing state legisla-
tion,147 it becomes easier to distinguish these cases from the more expansive 
language of Wickard and Raich. Accordingly, in short, “[w]here economic 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that 
activity will be sustained.”148 
Of course, Congress—that prognostic body of innovators and visionar-
ies—is rarely idle. In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
was conceived on the heels of a promise of change, and change’s constant 
bedfellow, upheaval, was not far behind. 
III. AN INTERLUDE: DOCTORS, LAWYERS, AND POLITICIANS (OH MY) 
The Affordable Care Act is likely the most widely known, and most 
widely misunderstood piece of federal legislation to date. The goal of the 
Act is to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance 
  
 144. Id. at 22. 
 145. Id. at 19. 
 146. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 15–32. 
 147. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Coun-
ter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 882, 892–97 (2005).  
 148. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 
(2000)). 
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while decreasing the cost of health care.149 The law is expansive, in fact, its 
“ten titles stretch over 900 pages and contain hundreds of provisions.”150  
In order to satisfy its goal, the Act requires insurance companies to not 
only extend coverage to those who would not otherwise be able to obtain 
insurance due to preexisting conditions or other health-related issues, but 
also forbids companies from charging higher premiums to the same.151 On 
their own, these provisions would not only result in significantly increased 
premiums across the board,152 but would actually provide a direct incentive 
to delay the purchase of health insurance until one becomes sick.153  
Such a system would scarcely resemble insurance at all. 
Congress’s solution to this problem came in the form of the individual 
mandate.154 “By requiring individuals to purchase health insurance,” the 
logic follows that this would then prevent “cost-shifting by those who would 
otherwise go without it.”155 Additionally, the mandate would force more 
healthy individuals into the insurance pool, in turn allowing “insurers to 
subsidize the costs of covering the unhealthy individuals the reforms require 
them to accept.”156 
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Affordable 
Care Act into law. That same day, thirteen states filed a complaint in the 
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Joined by several 
individuals, the National Federation of Independent Business, and thirteen 
more states, “the plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the individual 
mandate provisions of the Act exceeded Congress’s powers under Article I 
of the Constitution.”157 
  
 149. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 2650. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585. “The individual mandate requires most Americans to 
maintain ‘minimum essential’ health insurance coverage.” Id. at 2580 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 
5000A). If an individual is not exempt and does not “receive health insurance through a third 
party,” then he or she must “purchase insurance from a private company,” or be subject to a 
penalty payment to the Internal Revenue Service when it comes time to pay taxes. Id. at 
2580. 
 155. Id. at 2585. 
 156. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585. 
 157. Id.  
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III. LOWER COURT’S TREATMENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE THROUGH THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A great many lower courts heard, and continue to hear,158 issues sur-
rounding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.159 There were at 
least 26 district court cases on the matter, and another seven made it to the 
federal appellate court level.160 There were, however, only three appeals 
court cases that decided the case on the merits. And consequently, only three 
appeals court decisions addressed the commerce clause argument.161 In order 
to fully comprehend how the National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius (“NFIB v. Sebelius”) decision fits within the current understand-
ing of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it naturally follows to first examine 
what these appellate courts understood the law to be before the case reached 
Supreme Court review. 
1. Thomas More Law Center v. Obama 
First, the Sixth Circuit held, as the Supreme Court eventually would, 
that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act did not divest it of jurisdiction, after which 
it began its discussion of the Commerce Clause.162 So politically charged 
was the issue that the court made explicit note of the conflict, and affirmed 
that it rules merely on the constitutionality of the act—not the wisdom.163 
Additionally, the court deemed it necessary to note “[t]he minimum cover-
age provision, like all congressional enactments, is entitled to a ‘presump-
tion of constitutionality,’” and will be invalidated only upon a “plain show-
  
 158. See Timothy Sandefur, PLF Takes the Next Step in Challenging Obamacare, PLF 
LIBERTY BLOG, http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2012/plf-takes-the-next-step-in-challenging-
obamacare/ (last visited Aug, 19, 2013); see also Goldwater Institute Moves Forward with 
Challenge to Healthcare Law, AZNow.Biz, (June 28, 2012), http://aznow.biz/health-
care/goldwater-institute-moves-challenge-healthcare-law. 
 159. Bara Vaida & Karl Eisenhower, Scoreboard: Tracking Health Law Court Challeng-
es, KaiserHealthNews, (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories 
2011/march/02/health-reform-law-court-case- status.aspx. See Timothy Sandefur, PLF Takes 
the Next Step in Challenging Obamacare, PLF Liberty Blog (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2012/plf-takes-the-next-step-in-challenging-obamacare/; see also 
Goldwater Institute Moves Forward with Challenge to Healthcare Law, AZ Business Maga-
zine, (June 28, 2012), http://aznow.biz/health-care/goldwater-institute-moves-challenge-
healthcare-law. 
 160. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (“The issue of standing was prevalent in almost every 
decisions, and that issue resulted in many challenges being struck down.”). 
 161. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1283 (11th Cir. 2011); Thomas More 
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 162. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. de-
nied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012), and abrogated by NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 163. Id. at 541. 
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ing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”164 Following this 
was a history of Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence, after 
which the court’s analysis ensued.165 
To begin, the court sought to determine what class of activities the 
minimum coverage provision regulates.166 The question, the court deter-
mined, was whether the Act regulates activity in the market of health insur-
ance or in the market of health care.167 Citing Congress’s intent, the court 
found that Congress clearly intended to regulate the broader healthcare mar-
ket.168 Having identified the type of economic activity regulated, the court 
determined that “the minimum coverage provision is facially constitutional 
under the Commerce Clause.”169 Citing two reasons, the court first deter-
mined that there was regulation of “economic activity that Congress had a 
rational basis to believe has substantial effects on interstate commerce,” and 
second, “Congress had a rational basis to believe that the provision was es-
sential to its larger economic scheme [of] reforming the interstate markets in 
health care and health insurance.”170 
Upon addressing whether the Act constituted an impermissible regula-
tion of inactivity, the court expressed that “[a]s long as Congress does not 
exceed the established limits of its Commerce Power, there is no constitu-
tional impediment to enacting legislation that could be characterized as reg-
ulating inactivity.”171 Here, the court determined that the minimum coverage 
provisions regulate individuals who are, in the aggregate, already active in 
the health care market.172 Thus, the court upheld the minimum coverage 
  
 164. Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000)). 
 165. Id. at 541–42. 
 166. Id. at 542–43. 
 167. Id. at 543. 
 168. Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 543 (“The Act considered as a whole makes clear that 
Congress was concerned that individuals maintain minimum coverage not as an end in itself, 
but because of the economic implications on the broader health care market.”). 
 169. Id. at 544.  
 170. Id. Here, the court was under the impression that “Congress had a rational basis for 
concluding that leaving those individuals who self-insure for the cost of health care outside 
federal control would undercut its overlying economic regulatory scheme.” Id. at 547. The 
opinion cited the fact-finding Congress undertook, and determined it reasonable to conclude 
that failure “to regulate those who self-insure would ‘leave a gaping hole’ in the Act.” Cf. 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 . . . (holding that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that failing 
to regulate intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would ‘leave a gaping hole’ in 
the Controlled Substances Act).” Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 548 (“The vast majority of individuals are active in the market for health care 
delivery because of two unique characteristics of this market: (1) virtually everyone requires 
health care services at some unpredictable point; and (2) individuals receive health care ser-
vices regardless of ability to pay.”). 
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provisions by finding the provision a constitutional exercise of commerce 
clause power.173 
C. Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. Department of Health & Hu-
man Services 
The Eleventh Circuit was the only court of appeals to find the individu-
al mandate outside the bounds of the Constitution. In an act foreshadowing 
the Supreme Court’s, it began the discussion by espousing the dangers of the 
Commerce Clause.174 Here, instead of focusing strictly on a commerce anal-
ysis, the court framed its decision in terms of the entirety of the Constitu-
tion.175 
First, while ostensibly more favorable to the idea that the Commerce 
Clause may not be used to regulate inactivity, the court still found no prece-
dent for that assertion.176 Accordingly, it moved to the substantial effects 
doctrine, but determined that “[i]f an individual's decision not to purchase an 
expensive product is subject to the sweeping doctrine of aggregation, then 
that purchase decision will almost always substantially affect interstate 
commerce,” and thus it could not be applicable, here.177 
The court instead found it most “perilous” that “the individual mandate 
does not wait for market entry.”178 Which, despite several flowery para-
  
 173. See Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 549. 
 174. See Fla. ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 
1283 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 
(2011), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)) (“‘Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in 
the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects 
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our com-
plex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is 
local and create a completely centralized government.’  It is this dualistic nature of the Com-
merce Clause power—necessarily broad yet potentially dangerous to the fundamental struc-
ture of our government—that has led the Court to adopt a flexible approach to its application, 
one that is often difficult to apply.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 175. Id. at 1284 (“Therefore, in determining if a congressional action is within the limits 
of the Commerce Clause, we must look not only to the action itself but also its implications 
for our constitutional structure.”). 
 176. Id. at 1286 (“Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the formalistic dichotomy of 
activity and inactivity provides a workable or persuasive enough answer in this case. Alt-
hough the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause cases frequently speak in activity-laden terms, 
the Court has never expressly held that activity is a precondition for Congress’s ability to 
regulate commerce—perhaps, in part, because it has never been faced with the type of regula-
tion at issue here.”). 
 177. Id. at 1311 (emphasis removed). 
 178. Id. 
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graphs on federalism,179 effectively brought the court back to the original 
distinction it earlier purported to reject: activity versus inactivity.180 Caged 
in terms of compelled entry, the Court held the individual mandate unconsti-
tutional under the Commerce Clause.181 
Finally, after finding the individual mandate also impermissible under 
the federal taxing power, the court held the individual mandate to be uncon-
stitutional in its entirety.182 This case served as the entry point for the Su-
preme Court’s foray into the Affordable Care Act litigation, as it granted 
certiorari on Nov. 14, 2011. Before that, however, one more appeal would 
be handed down. 
C.     Seven-Sky v. Holder 
In the last of three cases to be discussed, Seven-Sky v. Holder,183 the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia wasted little time getting to 
the point. Correctly concluding that the issues presented “[would] almost 
surely be decided by the Supreme Court,” the court largely skipped the cer-
emonious litany of factual exposition, and delved straight into its interpreta-
tion of the law.184 
As the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court did, the D.C. Circuit Court, 
too, held that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act did not divest it of jurisdiction.185 
From there the court, again with little ceremony, began its Commerce 
Clause analysis.186 Mirroring the Sixth Circuit, the court here found no rea-
son why inactivity could not be regulated.187 Beyond that, rather than con-
tinue to discuss whether individuals were active in the market, the court held 
  
 179. See id. at 1312–13 (“The federal government’s assertion of power, under the Com-
merce Clause, to issue an economic mandate for Americans to purchase insurance from a 
private company for the entire duration of their lives is unprecedented, lacks cognizable 
limits, and imperils our federalist structure.”). 
 180. See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1311 (“Congress may regulate commercial actors. It may 
forbid certain commercial activity. It may enact hundreds of new laws and federally-funded 
programs, as it has elected to do in this massive 975-page Act.  But what Congress cannot do 
under the Commerce Clause is mandate that individuals enter into contracts with private 
insurance companies for the purchase of an expensive product from the time they are born 
until the time they die.” (emphasis added)).   
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1320, 1328. 
 183. 661 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012) and abrogated by 
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 184. Id. at 4. 
 185. Id. at 14. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 17 (“In short, we do not believe these cases endorse the view that an existing 
activity is some kind of touchstone or a necessary precursor to Commerce Clause regula-
tion.”). 
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that activity itself was irrelevant.188 Instead, the court looked to employ the 
substantial effect doctrine,189 finding it wholly applicable.190 As discussed 
earlier, the D.C. Circuit also thought that the shift to this doctrine early in 
the twentieth century occurred in recognition of the reality that the nation’s 
“economic problems are often the result of millions of individuals engaging 
in behavior that, in isolation, is seemingly unrelated to interstate com-
merce.”191 This is pivotal, the court imparted, because the very premise of 
the doctrine “is that the magnitude of any one individual's actions is irrele-
vant; the only thing that mattered was whether the national problem Con-
gress had identified was one that substantially affects interstate com-
merce.”192 Taking that into consideration, then, the court found the individu-
al mandate well within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause,193 
thus resolving the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act on those 
grounds.194 
V. NFIB V. SEBELIUS 
A. The Controlling Opinion 
When the time came for the Supreme Court to render judgment on the 
issue, Justice Roberts set the tone early: 
Given its expansive scope, it is no surprise that Congress has employed 
the commerce power in a wide variety of ways to address the pressing 
needs of the time. But Congress has never attempted to rely on that pow-
  
 188. Id. (“To be sure, a number of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause cases have 
used the word “activity” to describe behavior that was either regarded as within or without 
Congress’s authority. But those cases did not purport to limit Congress to reach only existing 
activities. They were merely identifying the relevant conduct in a descriptive way, because 
the facts of those cases did not raise the question—presented here—of whether “inactivity” 
can also be regulated.”). 
 189. Id. at 19.  
 190. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 19. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 20 (“Similarly, it is irrelevant that an indeterminate number of healthy, unin-
sured persons will never consume health care, and will therefore never affect the interstate 
market. Broad regulation is an inherent feature of Congress’s constitutional authority in this 
area; to regulate complex, nationwide economic problems is to necessarily deal in generali-
ties. Congress reasonably determined that as a class, the uninsured create market failures; 
thus, the lack of harm attributable to any particular uninsured individual, like their lack of 
overt participation in a market, is of no consequence.”). 
 194. Id.  
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er to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an un-
wanted product.195  
According to the Chief Justice, the answer was actually quite elemen-
tary. Under the Constitution, Congress may “regulate commerce.”196 The 
provision itself presupposes the existence of commerce to be regulated.197 
Indeed, it draws a stark contrast to other constitutional provisions such as 
the power to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a 
Navy,” and, using the logic that “if the power to ‘regulate’” something also 
encompassed the power to create something, then would these other provi-
sions of the Constitution not be superfluous?198 Further, the Chief Justice 
explained, while the scope of the commerce power is expansive, this power 
is uniformly construed as one that reaches “activity.”199 
The problem, he argued further, was that the individual mandate did 
not regulate existing activity, but “instead compels individuals to become 
active in commerce by purchasing a product.”200 This ability to compel ac-
tivity not yet in existence seemed too far a stretch for the Commerce Clause, 
and the consequences of allowing such a level of control to exist in the 
  
 195. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (internal footnote omitted). Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito issued dissenting opinions, but reached the same conclu-
sion as the Chief Justice in regards to the Commerce Clause through slightly different reason-
ing. 
 196. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) (emphasis omitted). 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id.  
 199. Id. at 2587 (“Our precedent also reflects this understanding. As expansive as our 
cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one thing in 
common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching ‘activity.’”). Interestingly, Roberts 
not only clarified decades of precedent, he also contradicted every appeals Court to rule on 
the individual mandate; all of which determined, in some form, that the Supreme Court had 
never expressly said that activity was a precondition to commercial regulation. See, e.g., 
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012), and 
abrogated by NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (“No Supreme Court case has ever 
held or implied that Congress’s Commerce Clause authority is limited to individuals who are 
presently engaging in an activity involving, or substantially affecting, interstate commerce.”); 
Fla. ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1286 (11th 
Cir. 2011), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) 
and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (“Although the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause 
cases frequently speak in activity-laden terms, the Court has never expressly held that activity 
is a precondition for Congress’s ability to regulate commerce—perhaps, in part, because it 
has never been faced with the type of regulation at issue here.”); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 547 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012), and abrogated 
by NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, (2012) (“The Supreme Court has never directly ad-
dressed whether Congress may use its Commerce Clause power to regulate inactivity, and it 
has not defined activity or inactivity in this context.”).  
 200. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587. 
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hands of Congress would, in the eyes of the Chief Justice, produce a parade 
of horribles more terrifying than broccoli to a preschooler.201 Indeed, if Con-
gress could address a national insurance problem by “ordering everyone to 
buy insurance,” then, under this theory, “Congress could address the [na-
tional] diet problem by ordering everyone to buy vegetables.”202 
Justice Roberts then went on to contend that the Framers would never 
have envisioned a Congress empowered with an ability to “compel citizens 
to act as the Government would have them act”:203  
“Congress already enjoys vast power to regulate much of what we do. 
Accepting . . . [a] theory [that] would give Congress the same license to 
regulate what we do not do, [would] fundamentally [change] the relation 
between the citizen and the Federal Government.”204 
Chief Justice Roberts rejected this as being incongruent with existing 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and thus, he was not willing to extend the 
Commerce Clause argument to the individual mandate as it existed in the 
Affordable Care Act.205 
B. The Concurring Opinion 
Justice Ginsburg, writing concurrently, joined by Justices Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, considered the Chief Justice’s rigid reading of the 
Commerce Clause “stunningly retrogressive” and lacking in sense.206 To 
begin, she discussed the inevitability of an individual participating in the 
healthcare market at some point.207 She then discussed the high costs of 
healthcare,208 the large number of Americans that did not have health insur-
ance,209 how healthcare institutions like hospitals are legally prohibited from 
  
 201. Id. at 2588–89. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 2589.  
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 2591 (“The individual mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely 
because they elected to refrain from commercial activity. Such a law cannot be sustained 
under a clause authorizing Congress to ‘regulate Commerce.’”). 
 206. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment but dissenting on the Commerce 
Clause issue). 
 207. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2610 (citing Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Nat’l. Ctr. for 
Health Statistics, Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults: Nat’l Health Interview Survey 
2009, Ser. 10, No. 249, p. 124, Table 37 (Dec. 2010)). 
 208. Id. (“In 2010, on average, an individual in the United States incurred over $7,000 in 
health-care expenses. Over a lifetime, costs mount to hundreds of thousands of dollars.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 209. Id. (“In 2009, approximately 50 million people were uninsured, either by choice or, 
more likely, because they could not afford private insurance and did not qualify for govern-
ment aid.”) (citation omitted).  
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turning away those in need of medical attention but unable to pay,210 and 
how the displacement of the medical fees of those unable to pay has resulted 
in higher medical expenses for the government and the consumers.211 
After evaluating the causal connections that comprise the foundation of 
the problem the Affordable Care Act—and thus the individual mandate—
were designed to repair, she then looks to Raich,212 Jones & Laughlin,213 and 
Wickard,214 for the underlying principles that would apply.215 Quoting Raich 
and reiterating Congress’s power to regulate economic activities “that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce,”216 Justice Ginsberg paired this with 
the rule from Wickard that the commerce power may be even extended to 
activities that may not individually pose a substantial effect on commerce, 
but when “viewed in the aggregate” would “have a substantial impact on 
interstate commerce.”217 She concluded that under this analysis there is no 
logical reason as to why this commerce power should not be applicable to 
the individual mandate.218 
Further, when enacted legislation touches on economic or social policy, 
Congress is given great deference in this area, and the question then be-
comes “(1) whether Congress had a ‘rational basis’ for concluding that the 
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, and (2) whether 
there is a ‘reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and 
the asserted ends.’” 219 To Justice Ginsburg, with a “[s]traightforward appli-
cation of these principals” the minimum essential coverage provision is 
proper, as “Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the uninsured, 
  
 210. Id. at 2611 (“Federal and state law, as well as professional obligations and embedded 
social norms, require hospitals and physicians to provide care when it is most needed, regard-
less of the patient’s ability to pay. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; Fla. Stat. § 395.1041(3)(f) 
(2010); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 311.022(a) and (b) (West 2010); Am. Med. 
Ass’n, Council on Ethical and Jud. Affairs, Code of Med. Ethics, Current Opinions: Opinion 
8.11–Neglect of Patient, p. 70 (1998–1999 ed.)”). 
 211. Id. at 2611 (“As a consequence, medical-care providers deliver significant amounts 
of care to the uninsured for which the providers receive no payment. In 2008, for example . . . 
health-care professionals received no compensation for $43 billion worth of the $116 billion 
in care . . . administered to those without insurance.”). Further, healthcare providers do not 
absorb these bad debts and the costs are shifted to those who can pay: the private insurance 
companies (who subsequently increase their premiums) and the government. Id. 
 212. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). 
 213. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
 214. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
 215. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment but dissenting on the 
Commerce Clause issue). 
 216. Id. (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 17). 
 217. Id. (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125). 
 218. Id. at 2617–18. 
 219. Id. at 2616 (quoting Hodel v. Ind., 452 U.S. 314, 323–24 (1981)). 
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as a class, substantially affect interstate commerce,” and this rational basis 
should have been beyond dispute.220 
VI. THE TRUE MEANING OF COMMERCE 
A. The Commerce Power is Extraordinarily Flexible 
 
Congress’s power to legislate via the commerce power is broad, espe-
cially the power as understood since Roosevelt’s New Deal. When looking 
at the interpretation of the Clause since Gibbons, and more importantly, how 
that interpretation shifts over time, the provision’s malleable nature becomes 
even more pronounced. Each Court interpretation on the issue, of course, 
molds and shapes that understanding. Sometimes these changes are minute, 
other times they are considerably large. To illustrate, take the Court’s inter-
pretations in Hammer v. Dagenhart, Jones & Laughlin, and Darby. 
Conceptually, the holdings between Jones & Laughlin and Darby, ap-
pear almost indistinct from each other. To refresh, in Jones & Laughlin, the 
Court concluded that determining the consequences of indirect or direct 
effects on commerce cannot be considered within a vacuum. To do so would 
be impractical, and thus, even if an industry can be separately viewed as a 
local industry, if that industry is active in commerce, then it is in the reach 
of federal power.221 Compare this with the Darby holding, where the Court 
determined that Congress’s commerce power is not simply confined with 
regulation among the states specifically, but instead that it extends to activi-
ties that affect interstate commerce such that it makes “regulation of them 
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the 
granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”222 Indeed, the 
message between the two seems so interrelated that one only complements 
the other. But when they are contrasted with the much older Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, the case the Court in Darby had to first overrule, and the dissi-
militude becomes more marked. 
This flexibility is important, specifically because it helps answer the 
question of how the Affordable Care Act decision impacts the understanding 
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The first critical step was to understand 
the evolution of this understanding to this point. When taking a step back 
and looking at the expansive scope of the Clause in this light, what appears 
is a fluid, flexible legal concept that reflects the consensus of the society in 
which it is interpreted. 
  
 220. Id. at 2617. 
 221. See also supra notes 77 through 82 and accompanying discussion. 
 222. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (citations omitted); see also supra 
notes 99 through 101 and accompanying discussion. 
586 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35  
B. Like a Pendulum223 
To place this more intangible concept in perspective, imagine that the 
law of the Commerce Clause is like a pendulum. A pendulum, in its basic 
form, is a weight suspended from a fixed point. When set in motion, the 
pendulum swings in an arc as determined by momentum and gravity. Gravi-
ty is the force that accelerates the weight back to the center (the equilibrium 
point), and the time it takes for the weight to swing fully to one side and 
then back to the other (a left swing and a right swing) is called a period. 
If the Clause’s interpretation is viewed as a pendulum, then let society 
be the gravity pulling that weight back to a point of equilibrium. The Clause, 
and thus its interpretation, may “swing” what may seem far to the left, or far 
to the right, but that space in between the left and the right, the period, that 
is what comprises the consensus. It is there we find this meaning in the 
Clause. When viewed in their entirety, the cases that string together the 
Court’s jurisprudence find themselves directly in the middle, at the very 
bottom point of the pendulum’s movement. 
We know this is the meaning, because whenever society does vehe-
mently disagree with a Supreme Court interpretation, commerce or other-
wise, that interpretation seldom becomes the last word on the matter. Similar 
cases are brought at later times to challenge those initial interpretations 
Congress amends statutory language in such a way that it may be more pal-
atable to the Court, and it is arguable that at least five of the twenty-six cur-
rent Amendments to the Constitution arose as a direct result of a Supreme 
Court case with which the public vocally disagreed.224 Thus, whenever such 
additional measures are not taken, then it can be fairly safely inferred that 
society, as a whole, approves of—or at least does not disapprove of—the 
decision. Put another way, that decision, interpretation, or understanding of 
the law falls within the scope of societal consensus.  
  
 223. The author would like to express an immense gratitude to Claude Skelton, Managing 
Attorney at the United States Department of Agriculture’s Office of the General Counsel for 
this section’s inspiration. Few possess his wealth of knowledge and even fewer his willing-
ness to spend an hour or more deliberating the finer points of constitutional theory with an 
upstart law clerk; this article would not be half of what it is without his contribution. 
 224. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Twenty-Sixth Amendment); 
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), overruled by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Twenty-Fourth Amendment); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) 
(Nineteenth Amendment); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), va-
cated, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (Sixteenth Amendment); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) 
(First Amendment). See also United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) 
(although not heard by the Supreme Court, promotes the women’s suffrage movement before 
Minor v. Happersett). 
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VII. WHERE DOES NFIB V. SEBELIUS FIT IN? 
Despite being one of the most well-known and most-followed Supreme 
Court decisions to date, a decision that may even be labeled as one of the 
most important Supreme Court decisions yet, it is doubtful that NFIB v. 
Sebelius, at least in respect to modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, will 
pose any great significance to the current understanding or state of the law. 
When considering what constitutes a great “change” or “shift” in interpreta-
tion or understanding of the commerce power, the interpretation and under-
standing as seen before and after the New Deal era seems the most apposite, 
and by comparison, the implications of the Affordable Care Act decision do 
not seem so extensive. Thus, for what amounted as to close to mass pande-
monium on that morning in late June of 2012, the decision itself changed 
very little. 
A. The Commerce Issue Presented by the Individual Mandate is Unique 
To begin, even if the Chief Justice’s commerce analysis is deemed any-
thing more than dicta, it is unlikely to receive more than a mention or two in 
the long history and development of the understanding of commerce power. 
To demonstrate, compare the core message of this portion of Chief Justice 
Robert’s opinion—Congress may not force individuals into commerce 
through the commerce power—with other uses of Congress’s commerce 
power.225 Indeed, how many times has Congress actually attempted to 
“force” individuals into commerce? The Chief Justices tells us—never.226  
Next, the individual mandate demonstrates an attempt at a legislative 
solution to a problem that is so unique that it warranted the argument that 
even if the authority to legislate did not fall within the scope of the Com-
merce Clause, it should be afforded its own exception, anyway.227 Further-
  
 225. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590–91. 
 226. Id. (“We have said that Congress can anticipate the effects on commerce of an eco-
nomic activity . . . . But we have never permitted Congress to anticipate that activity itself in 
order to regulate individuals not currently engaged in commerce. Each one of our cases, 
including those cited by Justice Ginsburg, post, at 2619–2620, involved preexisting economic 
activity . . . . Everyone will likely participate in the markets for food, clothing, transportation, 
shelter, or energy; that does not authorize Congress to direct them to purchase particular 
products in those or other markets today.” (internal citations omitted)).   
 227. Id. at 2591 (“The Government argues that the individual mandate can be sustained as 
a sort of exception to this rule, because health insurance is a unique product.”).  See also id. at 
2623 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment but dissenting on the Commerce Clause issue) 
(“First, the Chief Justice could certainly uphold the individual mandate without giving Con-
gress carte blanche to enact any and all purchase mandates. As several times noted, the 
unique attributes of the health-care market render everyone active in that market and give rise 
to a significant free-riding problem that does not occur in other markets.”). 
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more, if the Commerce Clause argument for the validity of the individual 
mandate were to have failed, and not be upheld on other grounds, it would 
only present Congress with the task of attempting to craft a similar solution 
in a different manner. It would not be the first time drafters were posed with 
the challenge of crafting language in such a way as to address a greater 
problem as well as concerns of the Court.  
B. Not Forcing People to Buy Broccoli is Not That Novel 
Perhaps most interestingly, though, is that the core concern of the Chief 
Justice is not as novel as he purports it to be. As discussed supra, the majori-
ty of his analysis hinges on the distinction between activity and inactivity, 
but this is actually a concern that has been addressed before in commerce 
clause history.  
In fact, over fifty years ago, late American historian and legal philoso-
pher, Arthur Schlesinger, noted this very detail in a discussion of the chal-
lenges faced by the drafters of New Deal legislation on the heels of Schecht-
er Poultry Corp. and Carter. There, Schlesinger explained that in order to 
both achieve the goals the laws sought and to survive judicial review, the 
legislation could be nothing short of “masterpieces of the lawyer’s art,” as 
one of the principal failures between the first set of legislation and the se-
cond was due partly to something very akin to the activity versus inactivity 
distinction that so worried the Chief Justice. As noted by Mr. Schlesinger, 
“The First New Deal characteristically told business what it must do. The 
Second New Deal characteristically told business what it must not do.”228 
It seems then, that since essentially the same concern was voiced and 
addressed by an earlier Court and Congress, it demonstrates how the Com-
merce Clause coming out of NFIB v. Sebelius, is not so foreign a concept 
after all. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The November 3, 1948 Chicago Tribune headline regarding election 
results stemmed from a culmination of factors—as did the headlines from 
major news sources around the country when it came time to announce the 
Supreme Court’s ruling on the Affordable Care Act. At the root of both mis-
takes, it seems, is a desire to report breaking news as quickly as possible and 
a reliance on what they thought they already knew—with the Tribune, polls 
and pundits agreed that Dewey was it—and with the Affordable Care Act 
most scholars thought it was the Commerce Clause upon which the decision 
hinged. And yet, Truman was President and the Affordable Care Act was 
  
 228. Schlesinger, supra note 50, at 392 (footnote omitted). 
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Constitutional, but this is where the two depart—that is—understanding 
constitutionality is far more difficult a task than understanding a final tally 
of votes. 
In Gloria Naylor’s essay Mommy, What Does Nigger Mean? Ms. 
Naylor explores how one word can hold a myriad of connotations. She does 
this through the allegory of a young girl coming to understand that a single 
word could be an insult or a complement, just based on the speaker or his or 
her intonation. The child had heard the word numerous times, and in numer-
ous ways, but when confronted with a word’s use in a way that was unfamil-
iar, the girl realizes that words hold a certain power—a power given to them 
by society. The theme of the story, however, is not simply this one realiza-
tion, but rather, that it matters less what a word is or what it may mean on a 
superficial level, but how it is understood and used by society that gives it 
additional—often tacit—meaning.  
This concept can be applied to constitutional interpretation. As demon-
strated through an overview of the history and evolution of the commerce 
power, the initial words chosen by the Framers certainly play a role, but the 
construal is shaped around a multitude of other factors. Thus, what the 
Commerce Clause means is also dependent on what society thinks it should 
mean.  
This is further illustrated by comparing commerce clause interpretation 
before and after the New Deal era with the recent Affordable Care Act deci-
sion. What took place during the New Deal is an example of a major 
change—a shift in what society thought the Commerce Clause should en-
compass, or mean—but, the controlling and concurring opinions in NFIB v. 
Sebelius are still heavily influenced by the more modern understanding of 
commerce clause interpretation.  
Additionally, as neither opinion actually present any overtly unique 
analysis, then it stands to reason that the Court’s decision to affirm does not 
pose any substantial effect, if you will, on the current state or understanding 
of modern commerce clause jurisprudence. Accordingly, even though this 
case was one of the most-followed, and tweeted, and talked-about decisions 
to date, insofar as the Commerce Clause is concerned, the law itself—and 
therefore the interpretation of it—essentially remains unchanged. 
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